One of the pleasures of sharing fun books and ideas with colleagues, is that you never know when they’re going to suggest something perfect. Here’s one story.
So, I’m working on this paper for a conference in Waterloo at the end of the month on the place of uncertainty in rhetoric. I’ve been wanting to write about this topic ever since I had an epiphany walking across the bridge between the East and West banks at UMN and realized that what I was really interested in was the Rhetoric of Uncertainty. In many ways, it’s the real core of my interest in science and museums. This paper is a small part of developing that project. My plan is to establish two points.
1. All science and natural history museums use appeals to uncertainty in the form of explicit or implicit stasis questions of fact and definition to create the conditions in which visitors acquire certainty and understanding. This is their traditional task, the one tied to science literacy.
2. Some modern science museum exhibits use appeals to uncertainty in the form of stasis questions of policy to create the conditions in which a particular problemmatic is opened up for visitors. At this level, museums offer a kind of rhetorical education. Intrigued?
The second point is the more significant one, of course, the one where I might be over-reaching, but I’m sure the nice folks at the conference will pull me back. The first one is me walking into the argument: making sense of stasis theory, establishing my assumptions, setting up the historical and conceptual shift that produces the modern deliberative exhibit. I spend a lot of time at this first level, because for some reason I can’t move forward until I have a solid framework.
The questions of fact and definition used at this first level often recapitulate and attempt to recapture for visitors the unsettled nature of science when museums were being formed. This is a point others make very well: science is essentially a forensic endeavor (hence the value of stasis theory), and the modern natural history and science museum is the result of decades of settling out those questions. For example, there was a time when we didn’t know that kangaroos existed or that the platypus was a real animal or that whales are more closely related to hippos than to cows. All of these things were uncertain, unsettled, and intensely argued over. When the museum takes them up today in order to communicate scientific knowledge, there is but a hint of this foundational uncertainty, which is meant to be transferred to visitors so that they’re curious — one of the basic assumptions of this paper is that curiosity (like rhetoric) exists only where we have incomplete knowledge.
For some reason that last paragraph captures a significant point that I can’t get away from: Natural history museums embody settled knowledge at the first stasis level, and today they try to reinvigorate those debates by asking questions like, “What is a mineral?” Essentially, there is an implied question of fact/definition that entire galleries of minerals or birds or plants or dinosaurs answer, and we’ve largely lost that connection. The museum chooses a rather inauthentic question in order not to help us appreciate the growth of knowledge that settled the museum but to help us care enough to read further and hopefully remember something. I want more out of museums, but stasis theory helps us understand both the formation and the current rhetorical appeals used by museums.
I really like hanging out with this question. I think that clarifying the relationship between forensic rhetoric, stasis theory, science, and the museum collection is a fascinating way for me to get a handle on what’s going on at a real fundamental level.
I’m far afield from the opening story, so let me bring it back home. One of my colleagues and I are trying to find a book we’d both like to read together. The one we’re on now, The Platypus and the Mermaid by Harriet Rivo, I just opened up today. I was immediately struck by how she helps to capture and contextualize exactly the stasis problem I’m saying is embedded in museum collections:
“Those sporadic squabbles served nevertheless as reminders that the road to consensus had been neither straight nor smooth. This was at least in part because the stakes involved in its achievement had been so high. Although in retrospect the consensus could (and ordinarily was) seen to represent the steady and rational interplay of accumulating data and evolving theory, its persuasiveness and authority had been less clear to earlier naturalists who encountered it in its incipient stages.” (10).
“These unusual animals called into question systematic flexibility at a different level, undermining the very categories that could not be stretched to accommodate them, as well as the principles on which those categories were based, and compromising the authority of the experts who endorsed and applied them” (11).
What we forget is how much was at stake, and how much these rather dusty, flat, and often poorly engaged galleries were once high drama fought at the level of fact and definition.
Now that those questions are answered and the galleries (largely) settled, the museum can do other things. One of those things is move us up the stasis ladder to questions of policy. That’s where the meat of this paper must go, but I’m enjoying clarifying this first step, which means, I think, that this might work as a book chapter.
To be continued…





